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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

LARRY TREADWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12812

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant appeals his conviction for the crime
of Unlawfully Possessing Marijuana for Sale. He was
convicted in the District Court for the Third Judicial
District in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of Unlawful Possession
of Marijuana for Sale.

...
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower
court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 10, 1971, two maids entered defendant's
room at the Best Western Motel in Wendover, Utah.
Eloise Lee, one of the maids, noticed a greenish broken
up substance on the dresser. She was not absolutely certain as to what it was, but merely had an idea (T. 64).
A third maid, Boby Avilos, entered the room and was
asked by the other maids if she knew what the substance
was (T. 64). Avilos said it looked like marijuana (T.
69). Avilos had seen marijuana on approximately ten
prior occasions (T. 70).
Lynn Poulsen, the motel manager, went to the room
and saw the marijuana (T. 75). He called Deputy Sheriff Marion Carter of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office
and told him someone was using marijuana. Carter went
to the motel around noon to talk with Poulsen.
Late.- the same day, May 10, 1971, Carter went to
the motel at about 4: 00 p.m., and at this time Carter and
Poulsen entered the defendant's room. The purpose of
this entrance was to determine if the defendant might
be skipping out without paying his bill. Carter and Poulsen only went to the room to see if the defendant's personal items were still in the room (T. 8). As Carter entered the room, he detected the odor of marijuana (T.
Such an interpretation would effectually made a night

10). C::l:'tsr was in thz room for only 10-15 seconds (T.
11); but Poulsen was in the room for approximately three
to four minutes (T. 76).
Be:~ause

C'lrtef smelled marijuana \.vhen he entered

the defendant's room, he continued surveillance of the
area. Carter was also bothered by the fact that the defendant didn't have enough money to pay for his motel
room, yet he wanted to give his car away at any price
and then buy another car and pay for it with cash (T.
13, 14).

Officer Carter called Fay Gillette of the Tooele
County Sheriff's Office. Gillette advised Carter that he
wanted a search warrant and that Carter should keep
surveillance on the defendant (T. 11, 12).
Officer Gillette obtained a search warrant. A search
was made pursuant to the warrant and 42 kilos of marijuana were found in defendant's room (T. 101).
Prior to trial, the defendant brought a Motion to
Suppress evidence of the marijuana. The Court denied
defendant's motion, finding the warrant was sufficient on
its face (T. 58-59).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE
SE ARCH WARRANT DOES ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER BOTH UTAH
AND FEDERAL LAW.
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the St.ate
of Utah provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
A renter of a motel room is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, a factor distinguishing the present case is that all persons within defendant's
room were there lawfully, and the search and seizure was
done pursuant to a valid search warrant (T. 58-59, T. 54).
Sheriff Gillette appeared before Judge Earl Marshall
May 11, 1971, with an affidavit which clearly described
the place to be searched: an apartment # 167, in Wendover Best Western Motel, Wendover, Utah, and a 1961
Black Jaguar, California license # YKH911.
I terns to be seized were marijuana, drugs, and drug
paraphernalia which might be used in committing a public
offense. The affidavit states the cause for the warrant:
1) Lynn Poulsen, a reliable informant and former Just'.cc of the Peace had personally observed marijuana in
said apartment. 2) Surveillance of said apartment and
automobile led to the belief thereby that drugs were contained therein.
Because of the disappearing nature of the property
to be seized, the affidavit stressed the urgency of the
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situation and requested that a day or night time search
warrant be issued. Whereafter, Judge Marshall being
satisfied that Sheriff Gillette's affidavit set forth sufficient fads to establish probable cause, as provided in
UtaJ1 Code Ann. § 77-54-6.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-3 provides: "A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause . . ." It
is the magistrate or the court who must be convinced of
probable cause, and not the affiant. Allen v. Lindbeck,
97 Utah 471, 93 P. 2d 920 (1939).

Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. 2d 242 (1943),
discusses the essential information required in a sufficient affidavit. The case states ~hat probable cause is
established when an affidavit sets forth facts " ... sufficient to cause a discreet and prudent man to believe that
the accused had the property sought to be seized." Id.
at 330.

In determining what is probable cause for search,
Utah looks to the weight of authority in Federal and
state courts. Allen v. Lindbeck, supra. In Lindbeck, the
court followed the majority view and stated that an affiant's belief is not enough, but that an affidavit must
contain facts upon which belief is based. This indicates
that an affiant's belief, supported with an adequate reason
for his belief, will constitute probable cause.
The facts in the present case demonstrate that probable cause was established. Gillette's affidavit acknowledged his awareness of defendant's possession of mari-
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juana, and then supports his belief with adequate reason.
Gillette's infonnation crune from Lynn Poulsen, a fonner
Justice of the Peace, and a reliable informant, who had
lawfully been in defendant's room and observed the marijuana. It would be difficult to establish a stronger reason
for probable cause than that of personal observation. Lynn
Poulsen saw the marijuana, and knew that there was
marijuana in defendant's room.

State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517
(1968), quotes the United States Supreme Court to illustrate the fundrunental precepts of a person's right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
* * *" had its origin as a safeguard against
highhanded and ruthless intrusions against persons, homes and property which had been perpetrated by officials of an oppressive government.
No right-thinking person would desire to minimize
or disparage the protections thus assured. But it
is equally important that such protections be applied in circumstances they were intended to cover
and that they do not become so extended beyond
their reasons for being that even where there is
no danger or likelihood of any such abuse, they
provide a cloak of protection by which those engaged in criminal activities may escape detection
and punishment. The essential thing is to keep
within the reasonable middle ground, between the
protecting of the law-abiding citizenry from highhanded or officious intrusions into their private
affairs; and the imposing of undue restrictions
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upon conscientious officers doing their duty in the
investigation of crime. It was undoubtedly in an
awareness of the desirability of avoiding the difficulty just mentioned that the language of the
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches,
but only those which are "unreasonable." Id. at
518-19.
Criscola, also illuminates upon the weighted balances
to be used in establishing the validity of a warrant, and
upon the advantages of a trial judge's position which entitles his determination to be clothed with propriety:

The question to be answered is whether under
the circumstances the search or seizure is one
which fair minded persons, knowing the facts, and
giving due consideration to the rights and interests of the public, as well as to those of the suspect, would judge to be an unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against the latter's rights. Due to
the responsibility of the trial court in controlling
the admissibility of evidence, and his advantaged
position to pass on such matters, it is his prerogative to make this determination. For those reasons
his ruling should be indulged with a presumption
of correctness, and should not be disturbed unless
it clearly appears that he was in error. Id.
Federal decisions demonstrate the essentials of probable cause. In declaring an unlawful search, Whitely v.
Warden, 401 U. S. 560 (1971), held that a judicial officer
must be supplied with sufficient information to support
an independent judgment of pr~bablecausz---------~- --------

-

--

'

--------

-

.

-----·

'"'

A recent case from the United States Supreme Court,
United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29
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L. Ed. 2d 723 ( 1971) , clarifies many of the gray areas of
search and seizure. Harris, involved a search warrant for
illegal whiskey. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction by relying on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84
S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), in stressing that affiant had never alleged that the informant was truthful,
but only prudent, and on Spinelli v. United States, 393
U. S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), in giving
no weight to affiant's assertion concerning respondent's
reputation. The Supreme Court then reversed the Court
of Appeals and held that both the Aguilar and Spinelli
tests had been met. Spinelli was satisfied because the
affidavit related a personal observation of the informant.
In Harris, the warrant was valid because the information 'vas acquired in a reliable manner (personal observation), and the affidavit explained how the informant
came by his information. The present case has a similar
situation: Poulsen acquired the information in a reliable
manner; he saw the marijuana and he knew there was
marijuana in defendant's room (personal observation).
Gillette's affidavit explains the reliable manner in which
P0ulsen's information was acquired.
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit does constitute probable
c~.use for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
A.

PROBABLE CAUSE MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY INCRIMINATING REPORTS

FROM AN II':FORMER TO AN AFFIANT.
(HEARSAY)
Hc2.rsay is allowed on "reasonable grounds". Draper

v. United States, .358 U. S. 306 (1959).

Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), is a
Jnnclm<J.rk case shmving that hearsay will support probable
ca.u~e. The affidavit in Jones recounted the tip of an
anonymous informant who claimed to have recently purchased narcotics from the defendant at his apartment,
and described his apartment in some detail. Although
the information in the affidavit was almost entirely hearsay, the court concluded that there was "substantial basis"
for crediting the hearsay. The informant had previously
given accurate information; his story was corroborated by
other sources; the defendant was a known user of narcotics.
Hearsay need not reflect the direct personal observations of affiant so long as the magistrate is informed of
the underlying circumstances used in arriving at the conclusions. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102
( 1965) . And courts should not interpret the affidavits
in a hypertechnical manner, but with common sense. Id.
In Aguilar, supra, an affidavit based solely on hearsay
was found insufficient because there was no information
presented to the magistrate to enable him to evaluate
the informant's reliability or trustworthiness, The affidavit in Aguilar failed because it was a mere affirmance
of the informant's suspicion or belief. Harris, supra, at
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578. The two pronged test for hearsay in Aguilar, is de.
scribed in Spinelli v. United States:
"While recognizing that the constitutional requirement of probable cause can be satisfied by
hearsay information, this Cowi held the affidavit
inadequate for two reasons. First, the application
failed to set forth any of the 'underlying circum.
stances' necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the inform.
ant's conclusion that the narcotics were where he
said they were. Second, the affiant-officers did not
attempt to support their claim that their informant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable'." Id.
at 412-13.
Even though an affidavit is entirely hearsay, there
may be a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Harris at 581-82.

1

An important factor in validating the warrants in
both Jones and Harris arose from personal observation:

"The affidavit in the present case, like that in
Jones, contained a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Both affidavits purport to relate the
personal observations of the informant - a factor
that clearly distinguishes Spinelli . . . " Id.
Poulsen's reliable personal observation of marijuana is
enough for a magistrate to independently conclude that
there was marijuana in defendant's room.
The Sheriff's surveillance substantiates reliability.
In United States v. Evans, 447 F. 2d 129 (1971) a post
office was burglarized. No one saw the crime committed,
but three residents saw the vehicle at the scene of the

1
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crime at the time of the crime. The affidavit contained
names and description. The warrant was held valid because the three separate witnesses substantiated reliability.
A Utah case, similar to the present case, upheld the
warrant and recognized the use of hearsay. State v.
Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347, 463 P. 2d 562 (1970). In Smelser,
the court said that the facts in the affidavit may be stated
on information and belief. Smelser also stressed the avoidance of a "hypertechnical" interpretation of the wording
of an affidavit so as not to destroy content or efficacy.
In acceptance of two of the leading hearsay cases, footnote # 4 of Smelser reads:
Jones v. U. S., 362 U. S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L.
Ed. 2d 697 (1960). See also U. S. v. Ventresca,
380 U. S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684
(1965), where the following affidavit was held
sufficient: "Based upon observations made by
me, and based upon information received officially
from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol
and Tobacco Division assigned to this investigation, and reports orally made to me describing the
results of their observations and investigations,
this request for the issuance of a search warrant
is made." Id. at 564.
Utah will accept hearsay in establishing probable cause.
The affidavit does not indicate that Gillette's beliefs
are based on hearsay upon hearsay. With regard to the
hearsay rule, Gillette and Carter may be deemed as one
person since they were officers working together in the

l~

couxse of duty. But even if the affidavit did contain hearsay upon hearsay, Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure allows hearsay upon hearsay in situations
v.rhcre hearsay is pe1missible.

"It will not do to say that warrants may not issue
on uncorroborated hear0ay." Harris, supra, at 584. The
hearsay in Gillette's affidavit is founded upon a substantial basis and does establish probable cause.
B.

THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTS THE AFFIANT'S CLAIM THAT POULSEN IS CREDIBLE AND HIS INFORMATION RELIABLE.
The affidavit states an exact description of defendant's automobile and room. It states that the initial
source of information was Lynn Poulsen, a reliable informant and a former Justice of the Peace; that acting upon
Paulsen's information a surveillance of the said apartment
and automobile was conducted, and that said surveillance
corroborated Paulsen's information in confirming affiant's
belief that drugs were contained in said apartment.
Probable cause is established by Paulsen's personal
observation, coupled with confirming observations during
surveillance. Draper, supra. Results from surveillance
substantiate reliability. United States v. Evans, supra.
Paulsen's declaration against his own interest further substantiates his information. Harris, supra. Such stated
facts may be stated on information and belief. State v.
Smelser, supra.
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In Harris, the court declared that it never suggested
that a previous reliability was necessary. The crux of the
issue is whether the informant's present information is
truthful or reliable. Because Poulsen was a former Justice of the Peace, his credibility, reliability, and loyal past
record of local law enforcement sustain his veracity. Infonnants who arc reputable citizens, not seeking immunity
or any other reward, are not subjected to the same degree
of reliability as professionals or those seeking immunity.
This is the holding of such cases as People v. Gwubman,
485 P. 2d 711 (Colo. 1971), and the recent case of the
Virginia Sup:.:eme Court, Guzewicz v. Commonwealth,
decided l\!Iarch 6, 1972, reported in part in 10 CrL 2486.
The very averments which appellants tend to thrust
upon this court by means of HYPERTECHNICALITY
are attacLcd heavily in Harris:
"Indeed, it emphasized that the affiant had never
alleged that the informant was truthful, but only
'prudent,' a word that 'signifies that he is circumspect in the conduct of his affairs, but reveals
nothing about his credibility.' 412 F. 2d, at 797798. Such a construction of the affidavit is the
very sort of hypertechnicality - the 'elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law' condemned by this Court in Ventresca. A policeman's affidavit 'should not be judged as an entry
in an essay contest,' Spinelli, supra, at 438 (Fortas,
J., dissenting), but, rather, must be judged by the
facts it contains." Harris, supra, at 579.
By viewing the present facts in light of Harris's common-sense and realistic fashion, the affidavit easily sup-
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ports a magistrate's independent and reasonable conclusion that Poulsen is credible, and his information reliable.

c.
THE AFFIDAVIT IS SUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT ALLEGES WHEN THE OFFENSE
OCCURRED.
The information given in Sheriff Gillette's affidavit
meets the time requirement. The sufficiency of the time
requirement depends on the circumstances and the context in which the statement is made.
"Such a statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite, although
exactly when this requirement is met depends on
the circumstances and the context in which the
statement is made." Annot., 100 A. L. R. 2d 527.
Cases have taken different approaches in satisfying
the time element. People v. Warner, 221 Mich. 657, 192
N. W. 566 (1923), did not require an allegation as to time.
A present tense in the affidavit may be sufficient. Hanson v. State, 55 Ok. Crim. 138, 26 P. 2d 436 (1933). The
word 'recently' may suffice. Douglas v. State, 144 Tex.
Crim. 29, 161 S. W. 2d 92 (1942); Waggener v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 258, 191 S. W. 2d 551 (1946). In Jones,
the words "on many occasions" was considered enough
to fulfill the time requirement.
Probable cause is more effectively justified when the
time of the application for the warrant is closer to the '
time of the acquired information. Franklin v. State, 437
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s. W. 2d 260

(Tenn. App. 1968). Sheriff Gillette applied
for the search warrant within 24 hours from when he received the information, and during the time the apartment was still under surveillance.
The affidavit lists the date of the request for the
warrant, the date of the signature, the date and time the
affidavit was prepared, and the date and time Sheriff
Gillette received his information from Carter and Poulsen.
The information received from Carter and Poulsen are
impliedly stated in the affidavit to be RECENT. Gillette's
acute awareness of time is recorded throughout the affidavit. He states that he fears the drugs will become nonexistent through destruction; that the aforementioned
property should be seized as soon as possible; and that
the urgency of the situation requires a night time warrant
to be issued. The criticalness of time is so acute in Gillette's mind that he is worried about hours rather than
days; hence, the affidavit even accounts for the valuable
time utilized in preparing the affidavit:
"the elapsed time reflected herein has been diligently utilized by your affiant in the mechanics of
physically preparing these documents, locating and
consulting with County Attorney Edward A. Watson, of this County, in reference to the aforementioned preparation; locating the appropriate magistrate; and transporting these documents to the
magistrate for his official action in connection
therewith."
The affidavit adequately describes Sheriff Gillette's
concern. He is in a position where he knows there is mari-
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juana in defendant's apartment. Defendant is in a room
under very transient circumstances, and the Sheriff fears
that if the illegal property is not apprehended within
hours it may become non-existent.
A distinguishing factor from the cases cited in appellant's brief arises out of the permanency of the defendant's abode. The affidavits in each instance indicated
that the defendants were not in transient circumstances.
Two of the three cases involved permanent living conditions, and the third involved a motel room in which the
defendant had been obseived on numerous occasions.
As cited by appellant, Dean v. State, 242 So. 2d 411
(1970), indicates that the court is not as concerned about
the date as it is the type of information contained in the
affidavit:
"
. the affidavit is deficient because it fails to
show that information received from the informant
was fresh as opposed to being remote." Id. at 411.
See also State Ex Rel. v. Attorney General, 237 So. 2d
640 (Ala. 1970). Gillette's affidavit clearly indicates that
the information is fresh and not too remote.

In State v. Kelley, 99 Ariz. 136, 407 P. 2d 95 (1965),
a warrant was held valid on grounds similar to Waggner
v. McCanless. The court in Kelley stated:
Certainly if the informant 'recently' received or
obseived the facts sworn to by the affiant, then
the requirement that the affiant state the date as
to when he received his information is also met.
Id. at 99.

1
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This indicates that the date upon which the affiant received his information will be sufficient. Gillette's affidavit satisfies the time requirement.
In resolving the issue of probable cause, a court would
do well to follow the advice of a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965):

"The Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are
to be followed and the constitutional policy served,
affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by
magistrates and courts in a common sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer before acting."
POINT II.
THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED FOR A
DAY OR NIGHT TIME SEARCH IS VALID
ON ITS FACE.
Section 77-54-11 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
The magistrate must insert a direction in the
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless
the affidavits are positive that the property is on
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the person or in the place to be searched; in which
case he may insert a direction that it be served at
at any time of the day or night.
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit states three times that
there is marijuana in defendant's room. " ... on oath ...
says that l1.e has and there is probable and reasonable
cause to believe, and that he does believe, that there is
now in the premises ... " Sheriff Gillette knew there were
drugs in defendant's room, and he had to seize said illegal
drugs before they were disposed of. In the urgency of
time, Sheriff Gillette requested a night time warrant in
the event circumstances would prevent him from serving
said warrant before nightfall.
Gillette's affidavit meets the averred criteria of positiveness:
"The rule requires averments of facts sufficiently persuasive to support a reasonable inference that the property is in fact on the premises.
A more rigid construction would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is in
the place to be searched. Such a construction
would enable the criminal to completely conceal
an illegal enterprise behind an insurmountable
barrier, provided, of course, he pursued it only at
night. * * *" Stewart v. People, 419 P. 2d
650 (Colo. 1966), at 653.
In construing positiveness, the court said it is relevant
to consider that said property was found at the place to
be searched. Id_ See also Annot., 26 A. L. R. 3d 943.
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The meaning of positiveness has its limits. An affidavit made on infonnant's infonnation and affiant's belief will satisfy probable cause for a night time search
warrant. United States v. Tolomeo, 52 F. Supp. 737 (D.
C. 1943) . "If personal knowledge of the affiant is required
few search warrants would authorize a night search." Id.
at 738. Observations of a person other than affiant may
support a night time search warrant. United States v.
Plemmons, 336 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1964).
The word "positive" in § 77-54-11 is not indicative of
a knowledge beyond all aboslute universal flawlessness.
Such an interpretation would effectually make a night
time warrant completely unattainable to police officers
who are fighting the evils of crime. Pre-trial events must
deal with common sense and probable cause in a realistic
fashion. The standard to be proven is not to reach a level
beyond all reasonable doubt:
Trials are necessarily surrounded with evidentiary
rules "developed to safeguard men from dubious
and unjust convictions." ... But before the trial
we deal only with probabilities that "are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Harris,
supra, at 582-83.
More important, the issue in warrant proceedings
is not guilt beyond reasonable doubt but probable
cause for believing the occurrence of a crime and
the secreting of evidence in specific premises. Id.
at 584.
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The warrant in People v. Carminati, 236 N. Y. S. 2d
921 (1962), was insufficient because it lacked the details
which Gillette's affidavit contains. In Carminati, the
court was looking for the following details:
"The affidavit upon which the search warrant was
issued contains no facts whatever from which the
issuing Magistrate could find probable cause for
believing that the warrant could not be executed
in the day time or that the property sought to be
seized would be removed or destroyed if not seized
forthwith."
Sheriff Gillette's affidavit is distinguished from Carminati
because Gillette's affidavit did show probable cause, and
an entire paragraph was written to demonstrate the potential need for a night time search. Gillette's affidavit may
be distinguished from United States v. Raide, 250 F.
Supp. 278 (N. D. Ohio, 1965). Gillette's belief is tantamount to a high degree of certainty, and he explains the
critical importance of the underlying circumstances which
were left out in Raide: Poulsen saw marijuana in defendant's room; Poulsen is a credible and reliable informant;
surveillance confirmed Poulsen's report.
Sheriff Gillette had strong reason to be convinced of
the later proven fact which demonstrated that defendant
did have marijuana in his room, and Gillette's affidavit
supports this conclusion. At the time of its issuance, the
night time search warrant was legally acceptable and an
essential for public protection.

1

1
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that Sheriff Gillette's affidavit
clearly establishes probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant to search for the 42 kilos of marijuana located
in defendant's room which were to be used in committing
a public offense.
The affidavit gives positive reasons for believing marijuana was located in defendant's room, and justifies a
night time warrant in order to prevent defendant's wrongful abuse of society.
In view of the foregoing argument substantiating
these points, appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
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